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institutions and ideology in explaining economic behaviour.  
Keywords: Ancient Greek economy; primitivism; modernism; substantivism; 
formalism; instrumental rationality; irrationality; ideology. 
 




1. Introduction  
 
German thinkers have been instrumental in defining and shaping the debate 
about the nature of the ancient Greek economy. The debate started in the 
nineteenth century as a controversy between the “primitivist” and 
“modernist.” The former viewed the economy as small-scale, lacking 
sophistication, reliant on home production and practicing self-sufficiency at 
the city-state level. The modernist view considered the economy as complex 
in its activities and organisations which were thought as comparable to 
contemporary advanced economies. The debate has continued in the 
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twentieth century as a dispute between the “substantivist” and the “formalist” 
views, where the former considered ancient actors as lacking rationality and 
economic activities as embedded in other spheres of activity especially 
politics and religion, while the latter saw economic activities as independent 
of other human pursuits and amenable to the methodology of rational choice. 
The present paper reviews the intellectual debt to the German scholarship, 
traces how the debate evolved and evaluates the contribution that economic 
analysis makes to the study of the ancient economy. 
The next section summarises the main tenets of the nineteenth century 
German Historical School of Political Economy whose views about the 
economy and objections against Classical and Neoclassical Economics 
triggered the controversy regarding the nature of the ancient Greek economy. 
Section 3 reviews the debates about the nature of the ancient Greek 
economy, first “primitivism” versus “modernism”, and its successor 
“substantivism” against “formalism.” With primitivism and substantivism 
rejecting that the ancient economic decision-makers acted rationally, while 
on the contrary formalism and modernism accepting it, Section 4 surveys 
the question of the applicability of economic rationality and variants 
thereof to the study of the ancient economy. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Intellectual antecedents 
 
Among the fundamental tenets of Classical Economics are that the 
economy is subject to laws that can be studied; society is stratified in 
social classes whose members perform different roles in the economic 
process; interdependent markets coordinate economic activities; the 
actions of self-interested individuals have unintended consequences; 
market competition ensures order and spurs development; and labour is the 
main source of a society’s wealth.1 Some of the most prominent 
characteristics of Neoclassical Economics, which followed the Classical 
Economics, are the notion of humans as constrained optimising decision-
takers maximising profits or utility under given resources and incomes; a 
subjectivist theory of goods value and income distribution (which was 
contrary to the objectivist theory of Classical Economics); examination of 
                   
1 See Kurz (2016) for details. In his wide-ranging and informative, yet brief and 
highly accessible, history of economic thought Kurz offers an illuminating and 
thorough account and critique of Classical and Neoclassical Economics. 
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changes at the margin (henceforth the label “marginalism”); consideration 
of production and consumption side-by-side (thus supplementing the idea 
of diminishing returns in production taken from Classical Economics with 
diminishing marginal utility); emphasis on substitutability in production or 
consumption, where different combinations of resources yield equal levels 
of production or utility; and investigation of the comparative static 
properties of equilibrium outcomes.2 
The Classical Economists were familiar with the writings of the ancient 
Greek philosophers; they were also well versed in ancient Greek history. 
Morley (1998) shows that David Hume, Adam Smith and Thomas 
Malthus, as well as Karl Marx, consistently referred to ancient authors and 
discussed issues relating to luxury, population size, slavery, maritime 
republics and colonisation. Nevertheless, as “they noted with satisfaction 
the failings and fumblings of classical [ancient] authors in the study of the 
economy” (Morley 1998: 95) the Classical Economists were excited by the 
realisation that they were introducing Economics as a new field of study 
and a new methodology. Morley also contrasts the attention of Classical 
Economists to the ancient authors with their contemporary historians, like 
Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) and George Grote (1794-1871), who were 
interested mostly in politics and war. As a result, the latter did not say 
much about the ancient economy.3 With industrialisation inaugurating 
unprecedented growth and raising a host of new economic and social 
questions, economic analysis largely stopped drawing inspiration from, or 
indeed paying attention to, ancient history. 
The “Early” or “Older German Historical School” emerged in the mid 
nineteenth century and reached the peak of its influence in the 1860s partly 
as a reaction to the growing ideas of Classical Economics and laissez faire 
spreading in Europe at the time.4 It argued for empirical observation and 
inductive reasoning in opposition to deductive reasoning from theoretical 
principles championed by Economics. The School claimed that human 
social constructions, like the legal system, the economic system and so on, 
                   
2 These (partial) accounts of Classical and Neoclassical Economics draw on Kurz 
(2016). 
3Nevertheless, Gibbon frequently applied a model of rational behavior to 
reconstruct historical decisions. I owe this clarification to Manfred Holler. 
4 For a succinct summary of the beliefs held by the German Historical School, their 
evolution and representative theorists see 
https://www.hetwebsite.net/het/schools/historic.htm. 
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were the result of the entire history of a people, and could not be derived 
from abstract rationalist principles by a theorist, nor could they be 
established by intelligent policy makers. For the “Early Historical School” 
of Roscher (1817-1894), Knies (1821-1898) and Hildebrand (1812-1878), 
economic behaviour was contingent upon its historical, social and 
institutional context. The School rejected the idea that economic theory 
could be applied universally to all locations and times. Analysis of 
economic behaviour had to be inter-disciplinary combining economics 
with history and sociology, instead of relying on mathematical modelling. 
Its analysis made use of “organic” metaphors in the economy and the 
society, and as a result it viewed economic history as a linear development 
through successive and distinct stages of increasingly complex 
organisation.  
In the 1870s the “Younger Historical School” group of scholars 
included Gustav von Schmoller (1838-1917) for whom the economy did 
not exist as an independent entity. Schmoller led a “historical-ethical” 
approach to economics in the “battle over methods” debate (Methoden-
streit) against the marginal utility approach of Neoclassical Economics and 
the Austrian Carl Menger (1840-1921) in particular. (See Kurz, 2106: 57-
81, for a detailed account.) Schmoller and his followers rejected 
marginalism, and maintained that formulation of economic theory could 
come only after a thorough historical study that discovers regularities in 
behaviour. Menger attacked this position arguing for constructing a theory 
on the basis of abstract individual decision-takers with needs and 
capabilities and interacting with each other in interconnected markets. 
“Both sides took their respective positions to excess. From today’s 
perspective, the Methodenstreit was intellectually astonishingly sterile” 
(Kurz 2016: 75).5 
                   
5 Reflecting partly the older “cameralist” tradition of German economics which 
focused on efficient government and securing largest state revenue (see Kurz 2016 
pp:14-15), the Younger School also emphasized economics as a normative 
approach and supported an active role of the state in the economy; its thinking 
influenced the economic and social policies of Bismarck. Two other prominent 
figures were Adolph Wagner (1837-1915) and Ernst Engel (1821-1896). The 
former authored the famous ‘law’ that during industrialization the size of the 
public sector increases faster than the level of economic activity. The latter penned 
the ‘law’ that as income rises, the proportion of household expenditure on food 
falls. 
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For the purpose of the present essay an important figure of the Younger 
Historical School was Karl Bücher (1847-1930). He studied ancient 
history and philology at the University of Bonn, submitted his habilitation 
thesis at the University of Munich in 1881 and held a professorial chair in 
Nationalökonomie at the University of Leipzig.  
 
3 . The debate on the nature of the ancient Greek economy  
 
3.1 Primitivism versus Modernism 
The ancient Greek world spanned over a long time, the Archaic Period, 776-
480, the Classical Period, 480-323, and the Hellenistic Period, 323-31 (all 
dates BCE). The Archaic Period witnessed the birth of the polis (city-
state), an independent political and economic unit controlling a small 
territory. Ober (2015) counts a very large number of them of various sizes, 
1,100 approximately, spread over the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and 
the Black Sea. This form of organisation reached its peak during the 
Classical period with Athens, Sparta, and Thebes as the dominant powers 
at different times. The Hellenistic period was characterised by large 
kingdoms which prevailed after Alexander the Great conquered the Persian 
Empire. They included the Kingdom of Macedon, Ptolemaic Egypt, the 
Seleucid Kingdom in Syria, and the Pergamon Kingdom of the Attalids in 
Asia Minor. In addition, forms of proto-federations appeared in mainland 
Greece, like the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, which brought together 
scores of city-states.6 During that period, Greek civilization spread into the 
eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea.  
In 1893 Karl Bücher started the debate about the nature of the ancient 
Greek economy by proposing what became known as the primitivist view. 
According to this view, the ancient economy was characterized by small 
scale domestic production intended primarily to satisfy the immediate 
needs of the family with no or little reliance on the market. Products were 
not standardised and as a result prices lacked uniformity, formats that 
today we would characterise as “thin markets.” Gifts and spoils from war 
rather than market exchanges were far more pronounced as means of 
acquisition. In 1895, Eduard Meyer (1855-1930), a professor of ancient 
history at Halle at the time, expressed the opposite position inaugurating 
                   
6 See Economou and Kyriazis (2018) and the literature therein. 
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the modernist view. He commented on the institutional and economic 
transformation of the Greek world from the Archaic to the Hellenistic 
times and identified elements of specialization, division of labour and 
trade. He considered that the economy contained aspects of modernity and 
that the difference was that the scale of the ancient market was smaller. In 
a similar vein, and based on archaeological evidence, the Russia-born, Yale 
historian and archaeologist, Michael Rostovtzeff (1870-1852) argued that 
during the Hellenistic times the scale of the economy was large enough to 
qualify as modern. 
Reviewing the controversy between the two German scholars, Bresson 
(2016) suggests that both were selective in the evidence used to support their 
arguments, and they were looking at the ancient Greek society from the 
perspective of nineteenth century European society. Bücher’s Historical 
School viewed the economy as the result of institutions which in turn were 
determined by power relationships among social groups, and supported an 
active economic role for the state. On the contrary, the modernist view was 
inspired by the free market economy of the Classical and Neoclassical 
Economics, focusing on methodological individualism and the construction 
of homo economicus, the rational actor who always chooses his actions to 
pursue his well-defined material interest, and has universal applicability. This 
dispute was far more encompassing than arguments about the nature of the 
ancient Greek economy. Bresson (op.cit.: 3) further argues “if commerce, 
money and even craft production were in fact present, the economy of 
ancient Greece was certainly not an ‘industrial’ economy. Although 
agriculture was the main productive sector, and though in the country-side 
self-consumption of what was produced was still the rule, it was not a 
‘primitive’ economy either.” 
The “Youngest Historical School” returned to the positive approach of 
the “Early School”. One of its leading lights and its last representative was 
Max Weber (1864-1920), professor of political economy at Freiburg 
(1894-96) and Heidelberg (1896-1903), whose writings relate directly to 
the analysis of the ancient economy. In his work on methodology he states 
that research in history, economics and social relationships cannot be fully 
inductive or descriptive as one must adopt a conceptual apparatus. Unlike 
the earlier Historical School which described development as a sequence 
of successive stages, Weber proposed the framework of four “ideal types” 
of behaviour, namely, action guided by instrumental rationality, by value-
oriented rationality or belief, by emotion and by tradition or custom. 
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According to Weber the ancient economic agents lacked instrumental 
rationality. He saw the citizen of the ancient city-state as a homo politicus 
instead of homo economicus. The homo politicus had no interest in 
developing enterprise, kept technology at low levels, and sought war booty 
instead of maximising profits or investing in capital. Similar primitivist 
notions in favour of the homo politicus also permeate the work of Joannes 
Hasebroek (1893-1957), professor of Ancient History in Cologne, on trade 
between ancient city-states. For Weber only the western capitalist 
economies were rationally managed. The ancient economy was ruled by 
institutions that had nothing to do with economic rationality, and had no 
independent existence in pre-modern societies. He advocated a sociological 
rather than economic investigation of the ancient economy. As is well 
known, Weber devoted significant effort to argue that the Protestant ethic 
of hard work explains the development of the capitalist economy. This 
argument changed the direction of Marxian causality where the class in 
control of economic relations determines culture and religion, to its 
reverse, where religion and culture explain economic relations. Thence, 
Weber further thought that lacking an ideology of enterprise and growth 
ancient Greece and Rome failed to transform to industrial capitalism.  
 
3.2 Substantivism versus Formalism 
Although between the two World Wars the Historical School faded, an 
offshoot appeared in the USA known as the “Institutionalist School” with 
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and John Commons (1862-1945) as its main 
proponents. They too emphasised that historical factors and power structure 
institutions rather than neoclassical economics models explain economic 
behaviour. Kurz (2016: 106) describes it as follows: “Old institutional 
economics” is rooted in an empirical and historical orientation and 
advocates an evolutionist outlook on economic phenomena; there is a clear 
line of continuity connecting it to the older German historical school. 
(“New institutional economics” [see below Section 4] instead studies 
social norms, organizational arrangements, and the like from the viewpoint 
of the neoclassical model of rational choice.) Its advocates do not argue by 
way of constructing models but rather more sociologically. They reject the 
figure of homo economicus and the two central concepts of neoclassical 
economics: the concept of rationality, in the (narrow) sense of optimizing 
under given and known constraints, and the concept of equilibrium. In 
their view, David Hume’s picture of people as “but a heap of 
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contradictions” – as the playthings of passions, instincts, and habits – is 
closer to reality than that of the coolly calculating automaton that is 
perfectly informed, foresees all possible circumstances in the world, and 
acts optimally. The view that man fully understands the world is totally 
alien to institutional economists, who see institutions as a way to cope with 
incomplete information and uncertainty. In The Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1899), Veblen identified social recognition and prestige as the chief 
motives of human action. Wealth and a high income are a means to the end 
of ‘conspicuous consumption’: the public display of wealth in order to 
impress others is reminiscent of Adam Smith’s ‘parade of riches’.”  
Following the institutionalist approach and drawing on anthropological 
research, Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) stressed that resources can be 
allocated through state redistribution, reciprocity (gift exchange), or the 
market, with the former two being most common before the capitalist era 
(he saw the latter as destroying the social fabric and as a transitory stage 
only to be replaced by a socialist system). Polanyi distinguished between 
“substantive” and “formal” economies. The former existed only to satisfy 
basic human needs, which were embedded in political and religious 
institutions. In the embedded economy, actors were not interested in profit 
maximisation, and, unlike the market system, prices did not correspond to 
the forces of demand and supply. On the contrary, for Polanyi only the 
modern market economy is a formal economy, as it is independent of non-
economic institutions and the impersonal forces of demand and supply 
determine prices. In his critique North (1981) explained that Polanyi had 
erroneously considered any deviation from the price-making market as 
non-economising behaviour, while, in truth, any form of voluntary 
contractual exchange involves a market transaction. 
The substantivist view of the ancient economy was established as the 
mainstream view by the contributions of Moses Finley (1912–1986), 
American-born professor of ancient history at Cambridge. He argued that the 
ancient Greek economy could not be analysed by the formal tools of 
modern economics. Finley claimed that the economy did not exist as an 
autonomous system independent of political and religious considerations. 
In his view, one first needs to understand the value system in order to 
understand the economy. He argued that decision-makers were motivated 
by maximising status, “an admirably vague word with considerable 
psychological element” (Finley 1979: 51), rather than maximising profit. 
Further, “So long as an acceptable life-style could be maintained, however 
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that was defined, other values held the stage” (Finley 1979: 147). For 
Finley, this system of beliefs contributed little to technological progress 
and retarded capital accumulation and economic development.  
Instrumental rationality assumes that the decision maker possesses a 
well-defined set of preferences and chooses the use of limited resources to 
satisfy his preferences, whereas the homo politicus is characterized by 
procedural rationality which assumes that each actor conducts himself 
according to social rules and norms. In the ancient Greek economy, the 
basic unit of economic and social organization was the household (oikos) 
comprising the house as a building, its equipment, the persons living in the 
house (including slaves) and their belongings, land, tools, plants and 
animals. The argument goes that profits and return to capital did not make 
sense in that environment. According to Finley, the value system of ancient 
Greece emphasized the wellbeing of the community over that of the 
individual; as a result, economic activities were subordinate to social and 
political pursuits. The purpose of economic activity was that the individual 
male citizen provided for himself and his family, ideally by farming his 
land. Manual labour in manufacturing workshops and market trade not 
linked to the family farm were looked upon with disdain as vulgar or brutal 
(“banausic”) work. Similarly, dependent work was considered as loss of 
one’s freedom. As a result, free wage earners were held in low esteem. 
Having satisfied the need for sustenance, the good citizen was expected to 
engage in the public, religious, political, and military life of the polis, and 
work for the wellbeing of the community. In the “substantivist” view, living 
off rents was “morally superior” to market pursuits. Finley further writes 
(1979: 44) “... in antiquity land ownership on a sufficient scale marks ‘the 
absence of any occupation’...”7 The city-based elite were a “rentier” class 
like a parasite living of the farmers of the countryside. Since economic 
actors neither aimed to maximise profits nor did they apply rational 
management, the economy remained small scale, focused on household 
production and pursued the ideal of self-sufficiency at the household and the 
city-state level. It follows that in that environment economic growth could 
                   
7 Similarly Cartledge (2003: 23) notes “The criterion of distinction [of wealth] was 
leisure: what mattered was whether or not one was sufficiently ‘rich’ not to have to 
work at all for one's living…The relationship of rich and poor citizens was 
conceived as one of permanent antagonism, which too often took an actively 
political form.” 
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only come from exploiting new lands, which meant that the ancient 
economy could never escape the Malthusian trap, the proposition that 
growth is bound by the availability of food which rises slower than 
population, so that any population growth or living standard improvement 
can only be temporary. For detailed works in this tradition examining 
various types of activities, see amongst others Humphreys (1970), Millet 
(1991), Sallares (1991), von Reden (2007) and Engen (2010).  
During the 1970s and 1980s Finley’s view was the established orthodoxy 
(Hopkins 1983). However, in light of new evidence and advances in 
economic theory, “formalist” accounts gradually won ground. Formalism 
maintains that economic actors are essentially the same in every place and 
in every period, so that we can treat both ancients and modern Greeks as 
seeking to maximize profits and utility as posited by the rational choice 
model. The formalist view does not deny the importance of institutions and 
culture. In truth, both modern and ancient economies are products of the 
cultural and social systems that created them and henceforth they are 
embedded. Adam Smith says that much in the opening sentence of ‘The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments’ (1759, Part I, Section I, Chapter i.1): “How 
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in 
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their 
happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it.”8 Nevertheless, according to formalism, consumers and 
producers maximised utility and profits and resources were allocated through 
the interaction of demand and supply.  
The formalist accounts of Burke (1992), Cohen (1992), Shipton (2000), 
Harris (2002), Amemiya (2007), Frier and Kehoe (2007), Halkos and 
Kyriazis (2010), and Harris and Lewis (2016) drew attention to the 
evidence that in the Classical and Hellenistic periods banking and 
international trade were large scale, market–based and characterised by 
sophisticated contractual arrangements. These authors considered decision-
makers as acting rationally and motivated by profits. Moreover, economic 
activity was independent of social relations and extended over 
interconnected markets, which nevertheless were less sophisticated than 
those of today. Instead of being parasitic, several city-states were flourishing 
centres of manufacture. Harris (2002) has shown that the Athenian economy 
                   
8 This position is accepted by Foxhall (2002, 2007), a self-characterized “irre-
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was characterized by extensive horizontal specialisation across a number of 
crafts created by the large range of different goods produced (but had little 
vertical division of labour to different stages inside a single unit).9 In 
accordance with economic rationality, unskilled labour was paid by the 
hour, for it was easy to monitor and observe its output, and skilled labour 
was paid by the piece. Harris and Lewis (2015) challenge the view that 
households aimed at self-sufficiency. Most cities had a permanent central 
market where demand and supply determined prices, and both rich 
landowners and merchants were seeking profits. Morris (2004), Ober 
(2015) and Bresson (2016) document that in the period 800-300, driven by 
the democratic institutions and culture of the polis, the Greek economy 
experienced significant growth. (See Tridimas 2018 for a summary of the 
growth profile of the ancient Greek economy and its decline.) 
North et al. (2009) saw the connection between economics and politics 
as a fundamental part of the long-run development process. They 
introduced the concepts of “natural state” and “open access” states which 
are directly relevant to the substantivist–formalist controversy, although 
(surprisingly in view of the fact that North 1981: 80-123 talked extensively 
about economic change and decline in the ancient world) they left the 
nature of the ancient economy out of their work. They defined a limited 
access or natural state as one where “personal relationships, who one is 
and who one knows, form the basis of social organization and constitute 
the arena for individual interaction” (North et al. 2009: 13), and “dispersed 
control over violence leads to the formation of a dominant coalition that 
manipulates access in the economy and the society to sustain political 
arrangements within the coalition” (North et al. 2009: 121). The natural 
state entails an economy embedded in the prevailing social relationships. 
On the contrary, in an open access order, “impersonal categories of 
individuals, interact over a wide area of social behaviour with no need to 
be cognizant of the individual identity of their partners” (North et al. 
2009:2), and “in open access societies, access to organizations is an 
impersonal right that all citizens possess” (North et al. 2009: 6). An open 
access order implies exchanges taking place through the market, that is, no 
      ___________    
dentist substantivist.” 
9 Information is mostly available for Athens, the most economically advanced 
Greek city-state. Its sophisticated democratic institutions and vibrant cultural life 
epitomised the prosperity of Classical Greece. 
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longer embedded economy. They considered all states as natural states in 
all recorded time up to the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries (ibid: 164). 
Centralised Sparta and Macedon were probably typical natural states; 
however, during the fifth and fourth centuries, democratic and 
economically successful Athens, where free and politically equal citizens 
collectively governed the polis, was not a natural state but had transformed 
to an open access state (Ober 2015, Acton 2016, Carugati et al. 2019). 
 
4. The applicability of the rational choice model to the ancient 
economy  
 
At the core of the substantivism–formalism debate is the question of 
whether the ancient actors were instrumentally rational. “A formalist 
believes that the Athenian economy can be analyzed by the basic 
behavioural assumptions of modern economics, namely, utility and profit 
maximisation, whereas a substantivist believes that a different set of 
behavioural assumptions, such as status maximization, must be 
substituted” (Amemiya 2007: 57). Other scholars take a more eclectic 
view. Christesen (2003) argues that in studying the ancient economy the 
assumptions of both instrumental rationality (homo economicus) and 
procedural rationality (homo politicus) are inappropriate; he contends that 
the notion of expressive rationality offers a more accurate description. An 
expressively rational individual typically responds to both individual tastes 
and societal expectations. Specifically, Christesen (2003: 55) argues that 
the ancient actors were interested in making profits, as per standard model, 
while simultaneously they valued land ownership as “procedurally rational 
in that agriculture was one of the normatively positive forms of 
acquisition.” Schefold (2011) argues that the modern neoclassical 
economic theory is at best of limited applicability to ancient Greece. 
However, he is keen to note “the great variety of model building in modern 
economics blurs the [non-applicability] since one often can construct some 
variant of a model that seems fit to represent some aspects of a pre-modern 
formation” (Schefold 2011: 131). Hamlin and Jennings (2011) review 
theories of expressive behaviour, the idea that an act may be motivated by 
the act itself rather than the outcome of the act. They identify three broad 
categories of theories of expressive behaviour, “expressing identity, 
expressing moral views, and expressing social pressures, ‘rational 
irrationality’ and self-delusion” (Hamlin and Jennings 2011: 648). Identity, 
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social pressures and morality may then seem to offer a modern theoretical 
basis for the refutation of instrumental rationality by substantivism.  
 
4.1 Irrational pursuits of ancient Greeks 
Substantivist scholars have argued that the ancient Greeks pursued a wide 
range of non-material objectives. We have already said that Finley 
emphasized maximization of status maintaining that “a model of economic 
choices … in antiquity would give considerable weight to this factor of 
status” (Finley 1979: 60). A second objective related to war or 
belligerence. War was prevalent in the world of the ancient Greek city–
states. For example, during the period 479–338, Athens was at war on 
average for two out of three years, and did not have more than ten 
consecutive years of peace. Ancient historians have portrayed the ancient 
Greek society as competitive, engaging in war because it championed the 
virtues of “andreia” (= pugnacious courage). Waging war promoted 
honour and status and confirmed a man’s loyalty to the city–state. 
According to Balot (2004: 407), “The ‘prototypical’ meaning of andreia – 
courage, or manliness – was the virtue that enabled men, and especially 
hoplite citizens to overcome fear of death on the battlefield ... Naturally, 
Greek speakers could produce synonyms ... Arete, a heroically tinged term 
... means ‘excellence’ or ‘valour’ or in specific military contexts ‘martial 
courage’.” Raaflaub (2009: 241) writes: “Competitiveness and a fierce 
spirit of independence on the one side, imperial ambitions to be realized by 
war on the other… War between communities, the Greeks believed, was an 
unalterable condition of human society.” For Pritchard (2015: 149), 
“extension of the traditional conception of aretē (‘courage’) down the 
social scale made soldiering attractive ... as a source of esteem ... 
Athenians could be so accused not only if they retreated from a battle 
before others but also if they failed to endorse a war that appeared to be 
necessary.”10  
                   
10 For references to the ancient authors and an extensive bibliography regarding 
war, see Pritchard (2010). Pritchard (ibid) also notes that the virtue of courage 
applied to hoplite (heavily armed infantry) fighting. Retreat in the sense of fleeing 
was shameful for an infantry soldier; however, it should not be confused with 
retreat as a standard and highly effective formation tactic to ram an enemy ship in 
naval warfare.  
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Additional non-material objectives related to seeking self-sufficiency, 
self-employment, farming one’s own land instead of manufacturing or 
trade, reciprocal assistance, often taking the form of gift exchange, 
interest-free personal loans called eranos (however interest was paid on 
credit for larger enterprises, like buying agricultural estates and financing 
maritime trade), altruism, as in the case of spending lavishly on a liturgy 
(privately financed public service), and self-sacrifice.  
Schefold (2011: 151f) discusses the irrationality of religious beliefs. 
“[Consider] the merchant who is to cross the Mediterranean with his ship 
and his load and who sacrifices a ram for safe arrival. Weber would have 
spoken of a traditional rationality in such a context, which led to an 
unnecessary cost. But von Mises11 (1933) criticised him, saying that the 
merchant was rational in his wish for a safe voyage, he only made an error 
concerning the means to achieve his end. This distinction is not of material 
importance. Clearly, the sacrifice can be described either way. The 
advantage of Weber's formulation is to emphasise the historical context, 
that of von Mises to focus on the economic problem.”  
 
4.2 Transaction costs and New Institutional Economics 
The pursuit of non-material interests seems to contradict the instrumental 
rationality hypothesis. Nevertheless, economists freely accept that strict 
instrumental rationality is an abstraction for the modern world, and by 
implication the ancient world. However, most economists adhere to the 
fundamental principles that (a) the relevant unit for the study of decisions 
on the allocation of resources is the individual, (b) individuals maximise an 
objective function subject to the relevant constraints, imposed by nature as 
well as devised by humans, so that (c) observed outcomes can be analysed 
as the interplay of demand and supply. In this light, patterns of behaviour 
which systematically deviate from those predicted by the postulates of the 
neoclassical assumption of instrumental rationality may be explained by a 
more incisive examination of the objective function and a more systematic 
investigation of the relevant constraints.  
Successful transactions require the exchange of information, but in an 
uncertain world, information is expensive to acquire and process while 
                   
11 von Mises (1881–1973) was a radical laissez-faire Austrian economist opposed 
to the use of mathematics in economics, who contended that all value and cost are 
ultimately derived exclusively from the subjective evaluations of individuals.  
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cognitive biases limit the capacity of humans to reason. As a result, all 
exchanges are characterised by (varying) transaction costs which include 
the cost of money and inconvenience imposed by the various activities that 
each party to an exchange may undertake to ensure that the expected 
benefit from the exchange will be realised. Humans then set up institutions 
and organisations to economise on transaction costs and align incentives so 
that exchanges can be completed successfully. Thus, actors may carry out 
their transactions individually or jointly in groups (depending on which 
alternative brings the highest benefit net of costs) and are subject to a web 
of formal and informal rules of conduct, which determine what individuals 
are allowed to choose from the set of feasible options. North (1981) called 
the groups of individuals “organizations” and the rules which constrain 
behaviour “institutions.” He went on to build a theory of economic change 
from the dawn of humanity to modern times based those notions. His 
theory of institutions has three building blocks. (1) A theory of property 
rights which describe the individual and group incentives.  The importance 
of property rights comes from the fact that there are occasions where assets 
are non-excludable common property resources causing free-riding 
problems which detract from socially efficient outcomes, while only when 
property rights are perfectly specified and enforced, and private and social 
costs and benefits coincide (which in turn maximises wealth). (2) A theory 
of the state, since it is the state which specifies and enforces property 
rights. (3) A theory of ideology which explains how different perceptions 
of reality affect the reactions of individuals to a changing environment. In 
this light, economics is still a potent methodology to analyse the choices of 
the ancient actor by amending the standard maximization framework to 
take into account ideological preferences which relate to non-material 
interests, and by incorporating a richer set of constraints relating to both 
the physical and social environment. 
The works of Coase on the firm (1937) and more recently North (1981) 
and Williamson (1985) have shown that by ignoring transaction costs 
Neoclassical Economics leads to erroneous inferences. The fundamental 
intuition is that actors set up institutions to decrease the cost inflicted by 
ubiquitous uncertainty. Institutions are rules, formal and informal, which 
constrain behaviour so that outcomes become more predictable and reliable. 
Institutions regulate conflict and govern exchanges which in turn affect 
incentives to produce, consume, invest and trade. Formal institutions are 
constitutions, laws and regulations; informal institutions include shared 
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cultural beliefs, social norms and customs which condition behaviour. This 
approach has been labelled New Institutional Economics (NIE). It has 
offered powerful insights to understand the decision-making of modern as 
well as ancient economic actors and uncovered evidence strongly 
supporting the formalist view.12 The ancient economy was an economy 
where “Information costs were high ... and transaction costs higher still. 
Markets were thin and fragmented, and usually very localized. A rational 
economic actor would have a hard time discovering which factors of 
production had the highest marginal returns to investment, and a harder 
time still capturing a high level of private returns” (Morris 2002: 24). In 
this connection, Lyttkens (2013: 5) recommends to view the ancient agents 
as utility satisficers, meaning that “individuals, in view of the cost of 
seeking information, of calculating consequences of different courses of 
action, etc., stop searching for superior alternatives once they have found 
one that is sufficiently good.” Nevertheless, caution is needed when 
invoking satisficing behaviour not to justify any outcome.13 
 
4.3 Rational Irrationality 
A distinct strand of research amends the standard instrumental rationality 
model by adding ideological preferences to the standard utility function 
from material interests. This is in fact standard procedure in spatial 
decision models studying collective choice outcomes. Decision makers are 
typically assumed to have Euclidian preferences regarding an issue, that is, 
they have an ideal or bliss point and suffer a utility loss proportional to the 
distance from the ideal point. This approach was labelled by Caplan 
                   
12 See the aforementioned works of Bresson (2016), Morris (2002, 2004) and Ober 
(2015). See also Lyttkens (2013) for a detailed discussion of applying NIE when 
studying the ancient world.  
13 Allen (2011) has also employed transaction cost economics to explain pre-
modern (1500-1800) institutions like the aristocracy, duelling, selling of public 
offices, tax farming, private roads and private police. He argues that when random 
natural forces render measurement of individual performance impossible, adverse 
incentives emerge with detrimental effects on welfare. To ameliorate these 
problems “communities required “patriarchal relations,” “feudal ties” and 
“chartered freedoms” to get many things done … these strange institutions had an 
economic logic designed to solve incentive problems that arose in the pre–modern 
world (p.7).” Van Bavel (2015) offers a critique of this efficiency-driven 
explanation; his critique emphasizes the distribution of property and decision-
making power in the society. 
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(2007) “rational irrationality.” He posits that in addition to wealth, 
ideology and emotion sway decision-makers and make them feel good 
about themselves. Hence, actors are interested in wealth maximisation and 
simultaneously hold “cherished views, valued for their own sake … [that 
is, they] have preferences over beliefs” (Caplan 2007: 14). Under rational 
irrationality actors believe that their beliefs are in their true interests. 
Pursuing ideological beliefs confers psychological rather than material 
benefits (recall the previous discussion of expressive behaviour). 
The psychological benefits are the subject-matter of behavioural 
economics which incorporates insights from psychology into economic 
behaviour (see amongst others Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This branch 
of literature has shown that actual behaviour may diverge from the 
postulates of instrumental rationality as a result of errors residing in 
framing effects (whereby spurious information may affect actions); loss 
aversion (namely, the disutility from a loss is larger than the benefit from a 
gain of an equal size), time inconsistency (where an actor plans today 
future behaviour, but when the future arrives he prefers to do something 
different), emotions, religious beliefs, norms of fairness held by the actors, 
and spiteful behaviour (or altruism, its opposite). According to behavioural 
economics, people do not always have well-defined preferences and 
people’s preferences about social outcomes are at least partly endogenous 
to the particular institutional and social context of their actions 
(Hargreaves Heap 2013). If so, behavioural economics is the modern basis 
for supporting the substantivist view that preferences are conditioned by 
the social context. Indeed, Lewis (2018) commends enlisting behavioural 
economics to analyse the ancient economy: “The classical Greeks, just like 
us, were limited by cognitive shortcomings to possessing at best a 
‘bounded rationality’, and they were far from dispassionate and wholly 
individualistic: like us, they were embedded in their own matrix of cultural 
institutions and values as well as the dynamics of social interaction” 
(Lewis 2018: 39).  
Be that as it may, the intuition from behavioural economics has been 
challenged. For example, Gull and Pesendorfer (2008) among others 
reaffirm that standard economics takes preferences as given and studies 
choices given those preferences, while psychology examines how 
preferences are formed. Further, on closer examination circumstances 
where economic actors do not seem to act rationally are explained away by 
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observing that the actors face subjective constraints which were not 
obvious at first reading of the decision problem. 
Somehow ironically, rather than analysing production or trade, recent 
scholarship in political economy has applied the rational choice model to 
examine political behaviour in ancient Greece. This line of research uses 
game-theoretic models to explore tyranny, the foundation of direct de-
mocracy, institutions like sortition and ostracism, public administration, 
courts and legal arrangements, and tax and expenditure policy outcomes 
within such institutions, which strike as peculiar from a modern standpoint. 
Lyttkens (2013) and Tridimas (2015) among others offer reviews of this 




We owe an intellectual debt to nineteenth century German scholars with a 
classical education who in the climate of great economic, political and 
scientific changes were curious enough to explore the nature of the ancient 
economy. The first wave of inquiry set those who thought of the economy 
as primitive against those who detected strong elements of modernity. The 
second wave embroiled a larger academic community inspired by ideas 
regarding rational behaviour and included Max Weber’s seminal 
contribution. This is the dispute between substantivist, who reject that the 
ancient actors were rational as posited by neoclassical economics, and 
formalists who employ rationality as a suitable methodology.  
This analysis closes with two related observations. First, substantivism 
has not proposed a formal mathematical model of the ancient economic 
actor. A model is an abstract construction, providing predictions based on 
realistic assumptions, and brings to the fore aspects of behaviour deemed 
as most important for studying the issue at hand. Given the denial of 
rationality and the multitude of factors which affect behaviour this is 
perhaps no big surprise. Nevertheless, this gap offers the economist trained 
in formal methods a potentially interesting field to explore. Second, work 
on New Institutional Economics emphasises the role of transaction costs 
and admits without serious reservations that ideology has an important 
                   
14The interested reader may also consult the Special Issue of the Constitutional 
Political Economy edited by McCannon and Tridimas (2018) and the references 
within. 
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effect on what is perceived as conferring utility. In so doing, it has turned 
the old Institutionalist position on its head: it applies Neoclassical 
Economics to explain history, social relations and the formation of 
institutions rather than the other way around. As a corollary, it suggests 
that what may be considered as irrational behaviour of the ancient actor is 
in truth fully compatible with the model of optimising behaviour. On this 
account, providing sound micro-foundations for the formal analysis of the 
ancient economy allows a better understanding of the economy as well as a 
better evaluation of economics. However, despite the sophistication of 
formal economic models, modelling ideology presents challenges. 
Behavioural economics has suggested ways to model status (or its counter-
image, altruism) as relative standing in the social ladder, but modelling of 
other ideological beliefs, like religion, self-sufficiency or heroism in the 
battlefield presents new challenges. 
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